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The Supreme Court, Due Process and State 
Income Taxation of Trusts  
Bridget J. Crawford and Michelle S. Simon
ABSTRACT
What are the constitutional limits on a state’s power to tax a trust with no connection to the state, 
other than the accident that a potential beneficiary lives there?  The Supreme Court of the United 
States will take up this question this term in the context of North Carolina Department of Revenue v. 
Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust.  The case involves North Carolina’s income taxation of 
a trust with a contingent beneficiary, meaning someone who is eligible, but not certain, to receive 
a distribution or benefit from the trust, who resides in that state.  Part I of this Article explains 
the background of Kaestner Trust and frames the constitutional questions that will be before the 
Court at oral arguments on April 16, 2019.  Part II examines how and why due process applies 
in the state income taxation context, with a particular emphasis on how familiar concepts of 
general and specific jurisdiction apply uneasily to donative trusts.  Part III articulates the reasons 
that the Court should hold that a state has no constitutional authority to impose a tax on trust 
income where the trust’s only connection with the forum state is the residence of a contingent 
beneficiary.  Kaestner Trust is the most important due process case involving trusts that the Court 
has decided in over sixty years; it bears directly on the fundamental meaning of due process.
AUTHORS
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Truth is stranger than fiction, but it is because Fiction is obliged to stick 
to possibilities; Truth isn’t. 
–Pudd’nhead Wilson’s New Calendar1 
INTRODUCTION 
Tic-tac-toe.2  Snap, crackle, pop.3  Larry, Curly, and Moe.4  Peas porridge hot.5  
Certain words seem to roll off the tongue naturally in threes.  For some lawyers and 
lucky individuals, this list of common verbal triads includes the words “grantor, 
trustee, and beneficiary.”  In the most general sense, a trust is a beneficial 
arrangement in which a grantor transfers assets to a trustee for the benefit of one or 
more beneficiaries.6  In the case of a transfer to an irrevocable trust—one that the 
grantor cannot change or undo—the grantor typically has no further control over 
the trust property.  The terms of the trust agreement dictate how the trust will 
operate and specify which state’s law will govern the administration and 
interpretation of the trust instrument.7  However, a trust’s governing law provision 
is not outcome-determinative for income tax purposes.  State X may choose to 
impose a tax on a trust’s income if the trust is created under the will of a decedent 
domiciled in that state, if the trust is administered in the state, if the trustee resides 
in or does business in the state,8 if some or all of the trust assets are located in the 
 
1. MARK TWAIN, FOLLOWING THE EQUATOR: A JOURNEY AROUND THE WORLD 156 (1897) 
(epigraph to Chapter 15).  Pudd’nhead Wilson is a fictional lawyer in a small town who 
produces a calendar with idiosyncratic quotations; local townspeople consider him a 
simpleton, or “pudd’nhead.”  See MARK TWAIN, PUDD’NHEAD WILSON AND THOSE 
EXTRAORDINARY TWINS (1894). 
2. See, e.g., Klay Kruczek & Eric Sundberg, A Pairing Strategy for Tic-Tac-Toe on the 
Integer Lattice With Numerous Directions, 15 ELECTRONIC J. COMBINATORICS 1 (2008). 
3. See, e.g., Snap, Crackle & Pop, KELLOGG’S RICE KRISPIES, https://www.ricekrispies. 
com/en_US/snap-crackle-pop.html [https://perma.cc/B4DP-FC8R] (dating first 
appearance of the cereal advertising slogan to 1929). 
4. See, e.g., Robert Gardner & Robert Davidson, Hypothesis Testing Using the Films of the 
Three Stooges, 32 TEACHING STAT. 49 (2010). 
5. See, e.g., FLORENCE WARREN BROWN & NEVA L. BOYD, OLD ENGLISH AND AMERICAN 
GAMES FOR SCHOOL AND PLAYGROUND 44 (1915). 
6. See, e.g., ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 385 (10th 
ed. 2017). 
7. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 107 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000) (providing that a trust’s 
governing law is “the law of the jurisdiction designated in the terms unless the 
designation of that jurisdiction’s law is contrary to a strong public policy of the 
jurisdiction having the most significant relationship to the matter at issue”). 
8. This is the approach taken by New York, for example.  See N.Y. TAX LAW 
§ 605(b)(3)(D) (McKinney 2018) (imposing no tax on a trust if no trustees are 
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state, or if a trust beneficiary resides in the state.9  Alternately, State X may choose to 
not tax the income at all.10 
Generally speaking, an irrevocable trust is taxed only once—as an entity.  That 
is, unless the grantor has retained certain powers over the trust property, the trust is 
treated for income tax purposes as an entity separate from the person who created 
it.11  The trustee will pay tax on any income the trust earns (or accrues) and 
retains.12  To the extent that the trustee distributes trust income out to a beneficiary, 
the beneficiary will pay tax on that income and the trustee will not.13  Unique 
challenges arise in taxing an irrevocable trust when the trust has significant 
relationships with multiple jurisdictions, when the trust has any beneficiary with a 
contingent interest, or when the trust has multiple beneficiaries in different 
jurisdictions.  For example, if a trust with a trustee domiciled in State X has 
mandatory income beneficiaries located in State Y, it may be that the trust is subject 
to income taxation in both State X and State Y.   
While the Supreme Court of the United States has previously upheld the 
constitutionality of multiple states’ imposing a wealth transfer tax on the same 
item,14 it has yet to address a case in which two or more states seek to impose 
income tax the same item of trust income.  The Court also has not yet addressed the 
constitutionality of imposing an income tax on a trust’s contingent beneficiary, 
meaning someone who is eligible, but not certain, to receive a distribution or 
benefit from the trust.  In many modern trusts, the trustees have discretion—but no 
obligation—to pay trust income or principal to a named beneficiary or a member of 
a class of beneficiaries.  Logically, if the trustee resides in State X, the trust assets are 
located in State X, the trust’s situs is State X, and the contingent trust beneficiary, 
although residing in State Y, never receives a distribution from the trust, one would 
think that such State Y would not have sufficient minimum contacts to impose a tax 
 
domiciled in that state, the trust has no source income from New York, and no trust 
property is located in the state). 
9. This is the approach taken by North Carolina, Tennessee, Georgia, and California.  See 
generally RICHARD W. NENNO, BASES OF STATE INCOME TAXATION OF NONGRANTOR 
TRUSTS (2019). 
10. This is the approach taken by Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, 
Washington, and Wyoming.  See generally id. 
11. But see 26 U.S.C. §§ 676, 677 (2012) (providing that where grantor of inter vivos trust 
retains certain rights over trust property, such as the right to substitute trust property, 
all items of trust income be treated as belonging to the grantor). 
12. JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN, WALTER HELLERSTEIN & JOHN A. SWAIN, STATE TAXATION 
¶ 20.09 (3d ed. 2018). 
13. Id. 
14. Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 372 (1939) (permitting both Alabama and Tennessee to 
impose tax on testamentary transfer of intangible property under will of Tennessee 
domiciliary passing to trustee located in Alabama). 
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on trust income that the beneficiary has not received and is not certain to receive at 
any time in the future.  The Supreme Court will now take up these questions in 
North Carolina Department of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family 
Trust.15  The Court will hear oral arguments on April 16, 2019, with a decision 
expected sometime in June.16  Kaestner Trust is the most important due process 
case involving trusts that the Court has decided in over sixty years.17 
Part I of this Article explains the factual background and procedural posture 
of the Kaestner Trust case and frames the constitutional questions that are before 
the Court.18  Part II examines how and why due process applies in the state income 
taxation context, with a particular focus on how the familiar concepts of general 
and specific jurisdiction apply uneasily to donative trusts.  Part III articulates the 
reasons that the Court should hold that a state has no constitutional authority to 
impose a tax on trust income where the trust’s only connection with the forum state 
is the residence of a contingent beneficiary. 
I. BACKGROUND: THE KIMBERLEY RICE KAESTNER 1992 FAMILY TRUST 
A. The Long Path to the Supreme Court 
On December 30, 1992, under a single umbrella irrevocable trust agreement, 
Joseph Kee Rice III created three separate share trusts, with one for the benefit of 
each of his three children and their descendants.19  The umbrella trust agreement 
explicitly states that New York law governs the terms of each separate share trust.20 
At the time of trust creation, both Mr. Rice and the initial trustee were 
residents of and domiciled in New York.21  On the basis of the residence of the 
 
15. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberly Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr., 139 S. Ct. 915 (2019) 
(mem.). 
16. Supreme Court of the United States October Term 2019, [Monthly Argument Calendar] for 
the Session Beginning April 15, 2019,  https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments 
/argument _calendars/MonthlyArgumentCalApril2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/253D-UZCY] 
[hereinafter Monthly Argument Calendar]. 
17. The last significant trust case involving state due process claims was Hanson v. Denckla.  
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (holding that Florida, the state of the 
decedent’s domicile, had no jurisdiction over Delaware trustees of a testamentary 
trust). 
18. See infra Part I. 
19. Complaint ¶¶ 11–12, 14, 17, Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N.C. Dep’t of 
Revenue, 2015 WL 1880607 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Complaint] 
(No. 12-CVS-8740), 2012 WL 12282023, aff’d, 789 S.E.2d 645 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016), 
aff’d, 814 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 915 (2019) (mem.). 
20. Complaint, supra note 19, ¶ 15. 
21. Id. ¶ 13. 
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trustee, the trust was subject to income taxation in the state of New York.22  At that 
time, no descendants of Mr. Rice were domiciled in or maintained a residence in 
North Carolina.23  Some years later, in 1995, Mr. Rice moved to Florida.24  In 1997, 
Kimberley Rice Kaestner, Mr. Rice’s daughter and a beneficiary of one of the 
separate share trusts, moved to North Carolina.25  She and her children 
continuously resided in North Carolina throughout the tax years in question, 2005 
to 2008. 
Pursuant to the terms of the trust agreement, the trustee was to distribute all of 
the separate share trust property to Kimberley Rice Kaestner upon her attaining the 
age of forty on June 2, 2009.  Prior to this time, however, neither Ms. Kaestner nor 
any of her descendants were entitled to any income or principal from the trust.26  In 
fact, the trustee did not make any discretionary distributions from the trust.27  
During this time, the trustee did, however, make loans from the trust in order to 
allow Ms. Kaestner to make certain business investments and to cover a capital call 
on a limited partnership interest held in another trust.28 
North Carolina imposes an income tax on any trust for the benefit of a North 
Carolina resident (as well as residents outside of North Carolina if certain other 
conditions are met).29  North Carolina makes no distinction between beneficiaries 
who actually receive trust income and beneficiaries who merely might (but do not 
in fact) receive trust income.30  In other words, according to North Carolina, the 
fact that a contingent income beneficiary resides in-state is sufficient for the trust to 
become subject to state income tax, regardless of whether the discretionary income 
beneficiary receives any distribution of income from a trust that otherwise has no 
connection with North Carolina. 
For the tax years 2005 through 2008 inclusive (before Ms. Kaestner’s fortieth 
birthday), the trustee filed a fiduciary income tax return in North Carolina and paid 
 
22. Id.  See also N.Y. TAX LAW § 605(b)(3)(D) (McKinney 2018) (imposing income tax 
based on residence of trustee in New York). 
23. Complaint, supra note 19, ¶ 12. 
24. Id. ¶ 16. 
25. Id. ¶ 17. 
26. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 2015 WL 1880607, 
at *2 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2015) (No. 12-CVS-8740), aff’d, 789 S.E.2d 645 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2016), aff’d, 814 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 915 (2019) (mem.). 
27. Complaint, supra note 19, ¶ 23. 
28. Kaestner, 2015 WL 1880607, at *2. 
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 105-160.2 (West 2017) (imposing tax on taxable income of 
estates and trusts where beneficiary is North Carolina resident or, in the case of a 
nonresident beneficiary, if trust income derives from North Carolina sources). 
30. See id. (imposing tax on taxable income of estates and trusts based on beneficiary’s 
residence in-state).  
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tax on the accumulated and undistributed trust income.31  In 2012, the trustee then 
filed a refund claim for more than $1.3 million paid during those tax years.32 
The trustee argued for a refund on two grounds.  First, the trustee claimed that 
the North Carolina tax statute is unconstitutional because it violates the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (and its state counterpart).33  Under 
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,34 
which, in 2012, was the most current guidance on the relationship between state 
taxation and interstate commerce, the Due Process Clause requires (1) “some 
definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and a person, property or 
transaction it seeks to tax;” and (2) “that the income attributed to the state for tax 
purposes . . . be rationally related to values connected with the taxing state.”35  The 
trustee of the Kimberley Rice Kaestner Trust asserted that North Carolina lacked 
minimum contacts with the trust.36  The trustee himself resided outside of North 
Carolina, the trust property and the trust situs were located outside of the state,37 
the trust assets had never been distributed to anyone located in North 
Carolina, and the trustee had not done anything to “avail [the trust] of the 
benefits and protections of North Carolina.”38  Thus, the trustee argued, 
North Carolina’s tax law clearly violated the Due Process Clause.39 
The trustee’s second argument was that North Carolina’s tax law violates the 
Commerce Clause of Article I of the U.S. Constitution.40  The Commerce Clause 
requires a substantial nexus between the taxed entity or person and the state, an 
apportionment of the tax to the degree of activity connected to the state, a fair 
relationship between the tax and the services provided by the state, as well as 
nondiscrimination against interstate commerce.41  The Kaestner Trust trustee 
claimed that North Carolina failed all of these requirements.  Most importantly, the 
 
31. Complaint, supra note 19, ¶ 22. 
32. Id. ¶¶ 24–25; Kaestner, 2015 WL 1880607, at *1. 
33. Complaint, supra note 19, ¶¶ 5–6.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
34. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (limiting conditions in which states 
may impose tax on interstate commerce). 
35. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N. Carolina Dep’t of Revenue, 2015 WL 
1880607, at *4 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2015) (No. 12-CVS-8740), aff’d, 789 S.E.2d 645 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2016), aff’d, 814 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 915 
(2019) (mem.). 
36. Complaint, supra note 19, ¶¶ 37–38, 43. 
37. Id. ¶ 37. 
38. Id. ¶¶ 37–38. 
39. Id. ¶¶ 36–40. 
40. Id. ¶¶ 5–6.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (reserving to Congress the sole power to 
regulate commerce among the states). 
41. See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). 
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trustee asserted that North Carolina lacked a “substantial nexus” with the trust.42  
Furthermore, according to the trustee, any state income tax was not fairly 
apportioned among the jurisdictions that did have a nexus with the trust, the North 
Carolina income tax discriminated against interstate commerce, and the trust did 
not receive services from the state in fair proportion to the tax the trust paid.43  
Having attacked the North Carolina statute on these two constitutional bases, 
the trustee then moved for summary judgment, which the Superior Court of North 
Carolina, Wake County, granted.44  The trial court reasoned that summary 
judgment was appropriate for two reasons.  First, the trial court found that the 
North Carolina law violated the Due Process Clause because the trustee had no 
physical presence in the state, the trust had no assets located in the state, and there 
was nothing to suggest that the trustee had ever attempted to avail the trust of any 
benefit under North Carolina law.45  Although the North Carolina Department of 
Revenue opposed the motion by arguing that the trustee conducted activity in the 
state by consulting with Ms. Kaestner from time to time, the court emphasized that 
the trustee, and not Ms. Kaestner, had sole and absolute discretion over the trust 
assets.46  Even the loans by the trustee to Ms. Kaestner were not of the type of 
“sufficient contact” or “purposeful” activity on the part the trust such that the 
undistributed trust income could be subject to taxation under North Carolina 
law.47  Therefore, the court found that the trust did not have the necessary 
minimum contacts with North Carolina to satisfy the elements of due process.48 
The trial court also analyzed the Commerce Clause claim, citing to Quill’s 
requirement that a business have a physical presence in the jurisdiction for the 
business to have the “substantial nexus” with the state as required by the Commerce 
Clause.49  The trial court found that North Carolina lacked a substantial nexus with 
 
42. Complaint, supra note 19, ¶ 43. 
43. Id. ¶ 42.  The trustee also asserted related violation of the North Carolina State 
Constitution.  Id. ¶¶ 46–49. 
44. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 2015 WL 1880607, 
at *12 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2015) (No. 12-CVS-8740), aff’d, 789 S.E.2d 645 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 2016), aff’d, 814 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 915 (2019) 
(mem.). 
45. Id. at *5. 
46. Id. at *6. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at *9.  See also Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (limiting conditions 
in which states may impose tax on interstate commerce).   
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the trust and that the state’s income tax was not “fairly related” to the services 
provided to the trust.50 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina affirmed the lower court’s 
grant of the trustee’s motion for summary judgment.51  Applying the standard that 
a North Carolina court may only declare a law unconstitutional when the violation 
is “plain and clear,” meaning its unconstitutionality “is demonstrated beyond a 
reasonable doubt,” the Court of Appeals found that the trust lacked the minimum 
contacts with North Carolina to make it subject to the state’s tax laws.52  Because the 
Court of Appeals found that the North Carolina law did not meet the requirements 
of due process, it declined to address the constitutionality of the tax under the 
Commerce Clause.53 
Still not deterred, the North Carolina Department of Revenue appealed its 
case to the North Carolina Supreme Court.54  The state’s highest court affirmed the 
lower courts’ grant and affirmation of summary judgment for the trustee, finding 
that North Carolina did not have minimum contacts with the trust.55  The North 
Carolina Department of Revenue then petitioned the Supreme Court of the United 
States for a writ of certiorari.56  North Carolina cited a split between four state 
courts that have held that in-state residence of a trust beneficiary is a sufficient basis 
on which a state may impose income tax on a trust, and five state courts that have 
held that such taxes violate the Due Process Clause.57  The Supreme Court granted 
the petition.58  The Court will hear oral arguments on April 16, 2019.59  A decision 
is likely by the end of June, 2019. 
 
50. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 2015 WL 1880607, 
at *9 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2015) (No. 12-CVS-8740), aff’d, 789 S.E.2d 645 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2016), aff’d, 814 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 915 (2019) (mem.). 
51. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 789 S.E.2d 645 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2016), aff’d, 814 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 915 
(2019) (mem.). 
52. Id. at 648–51. 
53. Id. at 651. 
54. Id. 
55. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 814 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 
2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 915 (2019) (mem.). 
56. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N.C. Dep’t 
of Revenue, 2015 WL 1880607 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2015) (No. 12-CVS-8740) 
57. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 
Family Tr.,  2018 WL 4942045 at *9 (2018) (No. 18-457) (noting a conflict between, on 
the one hand, courts in the four states of California, Missouri, Connecticut, and Illinois 
that permit taxation of trusts based on a contingent beneficiary’s in-state residency, 
and, on the other hand, courts in the five states of New York, New Jersey, Michigan, 
Minnesota, and North Carolina that prohibit states from taxing trusts based on a 
contingent beneficiary’s in-state residence). 
58. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr., 139 S. Ct. 915 
(2019) (mem.).  
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B. The Major Tax Issue Before the Supreme Court of the United States 
The question that the Supreme Court will address in Kaestner Trust is what 
constitutes sufficient “minimum contacts” between a trust and a jurisdiction for tax 
purposes.  Constitutionally permissible bases for trust taxation may include that the 
trust is created under the will of a decedent domiciled in that state, that the trust is 
administered in or has assets located in the state, that the trustee resides in or 
conducts trust business in the state, or that a beneficiary resides in the state.60  But 
where the trustee does not actually distribute any trust property to a contingent 
beneficiary, it is not obvious that the beneficiary’s residence alone constitutes a 
sufficient connection to pass constitutional muster.  The Court will address the 
question under a due process framework, not under the Commerce Clause, 
because neither the Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
reached the Commerce Clause question in Kaestner Trust.61  Furthermore, the 
trustee seems to have abandoned this line of argument after the state appellate court 
failed to address it.62 
In evaluating Kaestner Trust, commentators may be tempted to refer to the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.,63 issued shortly after the 
North Carolina Supreme Court in 2018 struck down as unconstitutional the state 
income tax on a trust with a North Carolina contingent beneficiary.  The Wayfair 
decision partially overruled the Court’s earlier judgment in Quill, and held 
that under the Commerce Clause, a state could impose a sales tax on a retailer 
that lacked a traditional physical presence in the jurisdiction.64  Because the 
Wayfair decision rested entirely on Commerce Clause grounds,65 its tolerance for 
taxation in the absence of a taxpayer’s lack of physical presence in the jurisdiction 
 
59. Monthly Argument Calendar, supra note 16. 
60. See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text. 
61. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
62. See, e.g., Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 789 S.E.2d 
645 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016), aff’d, 814 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 915 
(2019) (mem.). 
63. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). 
64. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).  The Wayfair Court upheld the 
South Dakota law against a Commerce Clause challenge and overruled Quill in part.  
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2080.  In Wayfair, the Court ruled that laws imposing state sales 
tax on nonresident sellers with zero physical presence in the jurisdiction are valid 
under the Commerce Clause “so long as [they] (1) appl[y] to an activity with a 
substantial nexus with the taxing State, (2) [are] fairly apportioned, (3) do[] not 
discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) [are] fairly related to the services the 
State provides.”  Id. at 2091 (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 
279 (1977)). 
65. Id. at 2080. 
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does not control the result in the Kaestner Trust case.  Kaestner Trust is strictly a due 
process case.  As noted by the Quill court (in a portion not overruled by Wayfair), 
challenges to a state tax regime under the Commerce Clause and the Due Process 
Clause may be related but are distinct.66  A state’s tax may be consistent with the 
Due Process Clause but violate the Commerce Clause, although the reverse is not 
true.67  Any tax that violates the Due Process Clause will necessarily will violate the 
Commerce Clause, because the lack of due process operates as a per se undue 
burden on interstate commerce.68  Thus, in Kaestner Trust, the important question 
is whether North Carolina has the “minimum contacts” required by the Due 
Process Clause.69   
II. DUE PROCESS AND STATE INCOME TAXATION OF TRUSTS 
The Supreme Court previously has addressed the issue of trust taxation in 
Safe Deposit Tr. Co. v. Virginia.70  In that case, Virginia sought to impose an 
intangibles tax on a trust sited in Maryland with a Maryland trust company as 
trustee.71  The trust had no assets located in the Commonwealth of Virginia, 
although the trust’s grantor and two discretionary beneficiaries were domiciled in 
Virginia.72  The Court reasoned in the Safe Deposit case that because the trust had 
its situs and assets in Maryland, and the beneficiaries were domiciled Virginia, 
allowing Virginia to impose a tax on the trust assets would require the Court to 
adopt “the irrational view that the same securities were within two states at the same 
instant and because of this to uphold a double and oppressive assessment.”73  The 
Court did not root its Safe Deposit decision in specific constitutional grounds, but 
rather in the more general, basic principles of the Fourteenth Amendment that 
limit a state’s ability to tax items only within its jurisdiction or control.74 
Because Kaestner Trust presents as a due process case, the question is what test 
will apply in determining whether a state tax system meets the specific 
requirements of that portion of the Fourteenth Amendment.75  Limiting its analysis 
to Commerce Clause grounds, the Court in Wayfair acknowledged that state tax 
 
66. Quill, 504 U.S. at 304. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 305–06 (citing Int’l Harvester Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 353). 
69. Kaestner, 2015 WL 1880607, at *9. 
70. Safe Deposit & Tr. Co. v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83 (1929). 
71. Id. at 89–91. 
72. Id. at 92. 
73. Id. at 94. 
74. Id. at 92. 
75. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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systems must also meet the requirement of due process principles.76  Indeed, the 
Wayfair Court suggested that state income tax nexus for Commerce Clause 
purposes should be evaluated under due process principles, and Quill required 
some physical presence in the forum state in order for due process to be satisfied.77  
Because a corporation is a mere legal construct with no inherent physical 
attributes, the Quill Court reasoned that a corporation’s “minimum contacts” must 
come in the form of in-state acts or property maintained in the state.78  Without 
minimum contacts, a state could not fairly tax a corporation.79  Because trusts, like 
corporations, are creatures of the law, the Quill reasoning as relates to the due 
process analysis (undisturbed by Wayfair) should extend to donative trusts as 
well.80  Fundamental fairness is the standard by which state income taxation of 
trusts should be judged for due process purposes.81 
The same issue—determining a corporation’s presence in a jurisdiction—
spurred the development of the Court’s due process jurisprudence in the personal 
jurisdiction area, beginning with the foundational case of International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington.82  The Court in Quill, in a portion of the decision undisturbed by 
Wayfair, recognized that International Shoe and its progeny are relevant to the state 
tax inquiry because the inquiries into state tax and personal jurisdiction due process 
are “comparable.”83  In determining that a corporation could be subject to personal 
jurisdiction in a foreign state by virtue of its contacts with that state, the Court in 
International Shoe articulated the due process standard commonly known as 
the “minimum contacts test.”84  To satisfy due process, the corporation must have 
minimum contacts with the state such that the maintenance of the suit does not 
offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”85  By parity of 
reasoning, the same “minimum contacts” should extend to the state taxation arena 
as well. 
 
76. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2093 (2018) (“When considering 
whether a State may levy a tax, Due Process and Commerce Clause standards may not 
be identical or coterminous, but there are significant parallels.”). 
77. Id. (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)). 
78. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992) 
79. Id. 
80. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
81. See Quill, 504 U.S. 298. 
82. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
83. Quill, 504 U.S. at 307–08. 
84. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 
85. Id.  The Court in Quill stated “[b]uilding on the seminal case of International 
Shoe . . . we have framed the relevant inquiry as whether a defendant had minimum 
contacts with the jurisdiction ‘such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’’” 504 U.S. at 307 (citations 
omitted). 
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Because a similar inquiry is applied to state taxation, personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence merits further analysis.  Personal jurisdiction breaks down into two 
types: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction.86  States have general 
jurisdiction over a defendant individual or corporation when that defendant has a 
large degree of contact with that forum state—a corporation that is incorporated in 
that state or does business in that state, or a human being who is domiciled in that 
state, for example.87  Thus, the defendant’s operations within a state are so 
substantial that it justifies a lawsuit against it “on causes of action [that] arise from 
dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”88  States have specific jurisdiction 
over a defendant individual or corporation when the degree of contact is minimal, 
but the cause of action arises from that isolated contact.89  In either situation, those 
contacts must satisfy due process, which calls for an analysis of whether the contacts 
between the defendant and the forum are of a quality and nature such that it is fair 
and reasonable for the nonresident to be subject to suit there.90  This analysis is 
fairly straight forward in general jurisdiction situations because general jurisdiction 
rests upon the premise that because the corporation or individual has substantial 
contacts with the forum state and has benefitted from the protections of the forum, 
it is not unreasonable to require that the defendant submit to jurisdiction there.  
The analysis of specific jurisdiction is more difficult, however, because the 
corporation or individual has a more limited connection with the forum state.  
Thus, it is more complicated to find contacts between the defendant and the forum 
state that do not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.  The 
specific jurisdiction analysis involves balancing the interests of the plaintiff, the 
defendant, and the forum state.91 
 
86. See generally Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) 
(finding no general jurisdiction and holding that specific jurisdiction violates due 
process). 
87. See generally Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014). 
88. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318. 
89. See Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E. 2d 761 (1961) (referring 
to Illinois legislature’s drafting of the first specific jurisdiction statute).  Following the 
decision in International Shoe, states began to enact “long-arm” or specific jurisdiction 
statutes.  See, e.g., id.  Generally, an individual or corporation could be amenable to 
personal jurisdiction in that state if the cause of action arises out of that individual’s or 
corporation’s contact with the forum state.  See also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (describing the due process limitations of specific 
jurisdiction). 
90. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316–19. 
91. Id.  Since the decision in International Shoe, the Supreme Court has tried to refine and 
clarify the standard for determining whether due process is satisfied.  See generally 
McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 
(1958); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 298 (1980); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); 
State Income Taxation of Trusts 15 
 
In cases involving state taxation of trusts, the principal challenge comes from 
the fact that a trust is not a traditional legal person; it is neither a human being nor a 
corporation.  It is an arrangement for holding property that splits legal title and 
equitable title.92  The Supreme Court itself has stated that a donative trust is “not a 
thing that can be haled into court; legal proceedings involving a trust [are] brought 
by or against the trustees in their own name.”93  A trust does not exist in corporeal 
form; there can be no personal jurisdiction over a trustee (the legal owner of trust 
property) unless the trustee is present in the jurisdiction.94  For that reason, if a state 
seeks to impose tax on the basis of the residence of a contingent beneficiary who 
may never receive trust assets, the question is whether the state has the requisite 
contacts required under due process to tax the trust. 
The requirements for due process would appear to be met in the case of a trust 
with a trustee resident or domiciled (as in the case of a human being) or conducting 
business (as in the case of a bank or trust company) in a particular state.  In Hanson 
v. Denckla,95 a resident of Pennsylvania had established a trust in Delaware, naming 
a Delaware bank as trustee.  The trust grantor then moved to Florida.  Shortly 
before her death, she changed the beneficiaries of the trust from her children to 
her grandchildren.  Upon grantor’s death, the remainder of the trust passed to her 
grandchildren, the designated beneficiaries.  The grantor’s children brought an 
action in Florida, alleging that the change of beneficiaries was ineffective, and that 
the children were the real beneficiaries of the trust.  The Supreme Court of Florida 
held that it had property jurisdiction over the trust and that the change indeed had 
been ineffective.  Yet before the Florida court rendered judgment, the 
grandchildren commenced an action in Delaware, seeking to have themselves 
declared as the beneficiaries of the trust, which the court granted.  In determining 
which state—Florida or Delaware—properly had jurisdiction over the trust, the 
Supreme Court of the United States held that the trust did not have sufficient 
contacts with Florida, and so Florida courts could exercise no jurisdiction over the 
trust.  The Court explained that the trustee, a trust company, “has no office in 
Florida, and transacts no business there.  None of the trust assets has ever been held 
or administered in Florida, and the record discloses no solicitation of business in 
 
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burnham v. Superior 
Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990); J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd., v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 
(2011); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011); BNSF 
Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017). 
92. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
93. Americold Realty Tr. v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012, 1016 (2016). 
94. Id. 
95. Hanson, 357 U.S. 235. 
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that state, either in person or by mail.”96  As the Court suggests in Hanson v. Denkla, 
the requirements of due process might be met if the trustee conducts substantial 
administrative activity in the jurisdiction, or maintains trust assets in the 
jurisdiction.97  All of these situations are examples of the trust’s having sufficient 
activity within the state, properly becoming subject to personal jurisdiction (and 
thus income taxation under the same analysis).   
In the case of a trust that specifically invokes the laws of a particular 
jurisdiction in naming its situs, the trust properly would be subject to 
personal jurisdiction in the forum state (in addition to possibly being subject 
to taxation in the jurisdiction where it conducts substantial activity).  While the 
contacts between the trust and the forum are isolated in the latter case, the cause of 
action, or ability to tax, arises out of those contacts.  Due process would be satisfied 
because the interests of the forum state are very strong when its laws govern the 
trust.  But the mere residence of potential—not actual—trust beneficiaries in the 
state, without additional forms of contact, likely does not rise to the level of activity 
that would trigger personal jurisdiction and thus income tax liability.  The contacts 
between the trust and the forum state would be too tenuous to be of a quality and 
nature that it would be fair and reasonable for the trust assets to be taxed by that 
state.  Taxation would hinge on the possibility that a trustee might make a 
discretionary decision to make a distribution from the trust, when the beneficiary 
has no control over this decision. 
III. HOW THE SUPREME COURT WILL RULE (AND WHY IT MATTERS) 
In light of the minimum contacts requirements of International Shoe,98 the 
Supreme Court likely will rule in Kaestner Trust that a state’s taxation of a trust 
based solely on a contingent income beneficiary’s residence in that state violates the 
Due Process Clause.99  A discretionary beneficiary’s interest is too speculative to 
give rise to the minimum contacts that are required under the reasoning and spirit 
of International Shoe.100  Allowing taxation based on the residence of a contingent 
beneficiary would eviscerate any common-sense understanding of “minimum 
contacts;” it would allow a state to tax on the basis of what might occur, not on the 
facts as they are.  There would be seemingly no logical limit to the reach of such a 
tax system. 
 
96. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251. 
97. Id. 
98. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
99. See supra note 33. 
100. Id. 
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If the Court concludes that North Carolina lacks the ability to tax nonresident 
trusts with resident discretionary beneficiaries, then Tennessee also will need 
change its law before the already-scheduled phase out in 2021 of that feature of the 
tax law.101  (Tennessee is the only other jurisdiction that taxes trusts based on the 
in-state residence of a contingent beneficiary.102)  In North Carolina and 
Tennessee, government officials should expect that a Supreme Court ruling in 
favor of the trustee in Kaestner Trust will trigger a flood of refund requests for tax 
years that are still open.  Because this may represent a real strain on state budgets, it 
is possible that the Court could declare its ruling to be prospective only.  There is 
nothing to suggest that this is under consideration in Kaestner Trust in particular, 
but it is an approach that the Court has taken in other cases.103  
Because there is no uniformity among state income taxation of trusts, it is true 
that any particular trust may avoid taxation entirely.  This might be because 
the trust is sited in a jurisdiction without an income tax, or in a jurisdiction 
that the trustee ex ante can determine will not impose a tax based on factors 
under the trustee’s control such as the trustee’s residence or domicile, where 
the trust conducts its administrative and other activity, the location of the trust 
situs or the location of the trust assets.104  Therefore jurisdictions that do impose tax 
on income actually distributed out to beneficiaries may want to revise their laws as 
follows.  In the year of the distribution, that state should tax not only distributions 
of current income, but any distributions that are attributable to previously 
accumulated income, even if the income had been added to trust principal (so as to 
avoid the problem of some income escaping taxation entirely by means of an 
accounting sleight-of-hand).105  Ultimately, a decision of the Supreme Court in 
favor of the trustee in Kaestner Trust may spur states to finally adopt some a 
uniform law for trust income taxation to make trust “situs shopping” less attractive, 
bringing greater stability to trust drafting and administration.106 
 
101. 2018 Guidance for Tennessee’s Hall Income Tax Return, TENN. DEP’T REVENUE (July 12, 
2017), https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/revenue/documents/taxguides/ indincguide.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F3FX-X8L8]. 
102. See NENNO, supra note 9. 
103. See, e.g., Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017) (making changes to 
derivative citizenship rules on a prospective basis only). 
104. See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text. 
105. This would be similar to the existing tax laws of California, for example.  See CAL. REV. 
& TAX CODE § 17745 (West 2019). 
106. A Multistate Tax Commission took up, but ultimately abandoned for lack of consensus, 
a project to create a uniform tax law for trusts and estates.  See, e.g., Trusts Work Group, 
MULTISTATE TAX COMM’N, http://www.mtc.gov/Uniformity/Project-Teams/Trusts-
Work-Group [https://perma.cc/F6ZW-3ABX]. 
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CONCLUSION 
Justice Harry Blackmun famously said that he knew he was “in the doghouse” 
with the Chief Justice if he received an assignment to write the opinion in a tax 
case.107  But Kaestner Trust is no dog of a case.  It broadly implicates basic principles 
of due process.  There are many reasons to allow each state to implement its own 
tax (and strong arguments in favor of a more uniform approach),108 but it would be 
fundamentally unfair to require a trust to pay income tax to a jurisdiction solely on 
the basis of the residence of a discretionary trust beneficiary who does not actually 
receive any trust distributions.  Once the beneficiary receives trust income, it is 
reasonable in all respects to subject that income to taxation.  The Court’s decision in 
Kaestner Trust will have lasting impact on the future of due process jurisprudence. 
Ultimately, trusts are creatures of legal fiction.  They exist because the law 
tolerates the idea that it is possible to split legal and equitable title to property.  
Trusts are not the inevitable consequence of some right to control property; their 
existence reflects the acceptance of the story of split ownership.  In the case of trust 
law, fiction is already strange enough.  State income taxation should hew close 
enough to material reality that a trust is taxed only when the trust has some 
meaningful connection with the jurisdiction.  An accident of fate—such as where a 




107. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Reading the Tea Leaves of a New Term, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1986, at 
B14 (quoting J. Blackmun). 
108. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
